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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AS A STRATEGIC TOOL

BY

KATHY J. PERRY Department of Defense

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## USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AS A STRATEGIC TOOL

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The technology revolution the world is now experiencing has changed the way we do business, the way we live, and the way we fight wars. Never before in our history has the population been exposed to the magnitude of information they are being exposed to today. This information has a direct affect on how the United States interacts with other nations, allies, and adversaries. A potential now exists to use information to our advantage in the pursuit of our national interests. This Strategic Research Paper examines the importance of using information in Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as a strategic tool for achieving national goals and objectives. It provides a review of national security policies pertaining to use of PSYOP, examines the availability and relevancy of PSYOP policy, and provides an analysis of the policy and recommendations to improve it. Additionally this research paper will analyze the use of PSYOP during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (DS/DS) and examine lessons learned from the use of PSYOP as a combat multiplier during this war.

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## THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AS A STRATEGIC TOOL

This Strategy Research Project examines the use of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as a strategic tool by providing a review of national security policies pertaining to use of PSYOP to achieve U.S. goals and objectives. This review will examine the availability and relevancy of PSYOP policy and provide an analysis of the policy and recommendations to improve it. Additionally, this paper will analyze the use of PSYOP during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (DS/DS) and will attempt to explain the most important aspects of PSYOP, focusing on PSYOP doctrine and training in terms of planning and operations. The formal decision-making chain was examined from Washington to the Central Command (CENTCOM) in Riyadh during DS/DS along with actual theater aspects of PSYOP that illustrate how PSYOP were combined with other operations to influence approximately 87,000 Iraqis to surrender. Lessons learned from the use of PSYOP as a combat multiplier during this war may provide valuable insights for future conflict. Recommendations are made to improve the use of PSYOP as a strategic tool for full spectrum warfare.

The key trends affecting PSYOP are directly related to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Since PSYOP deal largely with information, and information is the core of the RMA, then it is logical to conclude that PSYOP will play a major role in future warfare. The ongoing revolution in information technologies is the driving force behind the RMA. Although it is difficult to predict the future, current trends indicate that the strategic context in the future will be significantly different from today. Some of the key features of this new strategic context might include the continued absence of a peer competitor, weaker alliances, less stability, heightened prospects for both regional conflict and mid-intensity conventional warfare, and persistence of low-intensity internal warfare and international lawlessness. A significant theme will continue to be the proliferation of information. The growing availability of global television with real time reporting coupled with internet type technologies will have a significant impact on a larger number of the world's population. The CNN Factor will have a greatly enhanced impact on decision-making processes and diplomacy. World opinion will be swayed by whoever controls information flowing across the various media available to the masses. An added dimension will be our ability to wage limited warfare under the scrutiny of the public. Every move will be examined by experts and second-guessed. Our decisions will be made by answering the question, "How will this look on television?" The concern here will be the decline of popular support for military involvement. The use and manipulation of information will also become more important in the conduct of PSYOP.

#### PROMOTING NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES USING PSYOP

Joint Publication 3-53 defines PSYOP as "operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals." PSYOP are a critical part of U.S. instruments of power that include political, military, economic, and informational

activities. The use of PSYOP can be done in conjunction with any of these instruments. When used effectively, PSYOP can reduce the efficiency of enemy forces and could create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks. The reason to use PSYOP to achieve our objectives is explained well by Sun Tzu when he wrote, "those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle." <sup>3</sup>

An examination of policy documents revealed few specific policy directives at the strategic level. However, based on the definition provided above, one can infer from the remarks made by President Clinton in the Preface to the National Security Strategy (NSS) that the use of PSYOP provides a valuable tool to implement this strategy. He writes, "The United States has profound interests at stake in the health of a global economy. Our future prosperity depends upon a stable international financial system and robust global growth." One of the three objectives of this strategy is to promote democracy abroad. Throughout the NSS, numerous references are made to U.S. international interests and our commitment to the imperative of engagement. To maintain our global leadership and remain actively engaged in promoting democracy throughout the world, the instruments of national power will be utilized. Strategic PSYOP are international information activities conducted by U.S. Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. By definition, PSYOP will play an important role as one of the national instruments of power that can be used to achieve our objectives.

To support the NSS, the Department of Defense must be able to shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of a uncertain future. These elements of shaping, responding, and preparing define the essence of the U.S. national defense strategy and depend on cooperative enduring relationships with our U.S. allies and friends in key regions. The National Military Strategy provides further policy, although not specifically addressing PSYOP, in the tenet of Information Superiority that comprises the Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future element of the strategy. This tenet must be achieved in the future battle space through offensive and defensive information operations. Again, by definition, PSYOP provide the mechanism for offensive information operations. Joint Publication 3-53 states that the effects of our military capability can be multiplied by communicating directly to the opposing force.

The primary policy document pertaining to PSYOP is the Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan, dated March 1990, hereafter referred to as the Master Plan. This document reflects a variety of DOD initiatives executed in support of the Presidential directive to integrate US international information programs. The roles and tasks of DOD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, and the Services are outlined in this plan in great detail. This master plan describes the policy that military PSYOP support U.S. national security policy and a wide range of military missions. It also recommends that staff responsibility for PSYOP planning and operational functions be separated from special operations. In September 1987, the Secretary of Defense approved assigning Army and Air Force Active and Reserve Component PSYOP units to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The U.S. Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) has declared

his intentions to assume responsibility for all PSYOP missions in his role as a supporting CINC for the Unified and Specified Commands. Prior to the establishment of USSOCOM, the Master Plan called for the creation of a permanent Joint Psychological Operations Center (JPOC) to provide DOD-wide PSYOP with strategic focus and the capability to coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies.

Joint Publication 3-53 provides the detailed policy guidance to the CINCs. The approval by the appropriate authority of a planned PSYOP campaign is required before the execution of any psychological operation. The approval process during peacetime, hostilities short of war, and during war differ. The regional CINC develops PSYOP campaign plans during peacetime and war to support national goals in his region. The CINC forwards the campaign plan to the DOD staff for coordination with other government agencies and approval as detailed in the DOD directive. This directive requires coordination of all peacetime PSYOP campaigns with government agencies and the approval of the NCA before execution. During war, the regional CINC has approval authority and this authority may be delegated down to a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. It is the sensitivity of PSYOP, combined with the need to coordinate all U.S. Government information efforts, that dictates the retention of PSYOP campaign approval authority at the unified command level.<sup>8</sup>

The policy for conducting PSYOP is not clearly stated in the NSS and the National Military Strategy. More detailed policy guidance is provided in the PSYOP Master Plan and Joint Publication 3-53. When looking at PSYOP in the overarching sense of strategic information, the policies are consistent with the NSS. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises the Secretary of Defense on the use of military PSYOP to achieve national, strategic and theater military objectives. He prepares the strategic plans and issues policy for the use of military PSYOP in peacetime or conflict, and supports the overall conduct of war.<sup>9</sup>

Although the importance of PSYOP in future warfare is significant, our capabilities in this area have not been adequately addressed. We need high level policy statements to clarify the role of DOD in the U.S. government's overall international information program. The Department of Defense should be required to publish policy that clearly addresses the roles and responsibility for international information activities among PSYOP, public affairs, and public diplomacy. PSYOP will need to be thought about in terms of strategic information capabilities. This larger context is necessary because of the impact of the RMA, with its increased operations tempo, increasing transparency of the battlefield, and nearly real time reporting by the global media. A major effort must be made to couple PSYOP with policy, political, and diplomatic decisions at the highest level.

## **PLANNING PSYOP FOR WAR**

Now that a review of definitions and policies pertaining to PSYOP have been presented, the use of PSYOP during the Desert Shield/ Desert Storm (DS/DS) operations will be examined to determine the validity of using PSYOP as a strategic tool. A report on the planning and conduct of PSYOP was published by USSOCOM following the war.<sup>10</sup> From this report I will summarize the pertinent information

that applies to the strategic perspective. This will include a brief review of operational PSYOP to highlight the requirement for a holistic approach when conducting PSYOP. An integrated approach must cross the often-used levels of warfare. This is a result of the permutation of information in today's society by electronic means. An action at the lowest level, if captured by the media and released to the public, could result in a consequence at all levels of warfare.

To review, Strategic PSYOP consists of information programs and actions conducted regionally or worldwide by governmental agencies to influence foreign perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. Both sides of the DS/DS conflict engaged in strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP. In the US these programs are usually conducted by civilian agencies under Department of State (DOS) coordination, with DOD efforts and assets sometimes being employed. During DS/DS DOD supplied a representative to each of three ad hoc PSYOP policy committees made up of such civilian agencies to help ensure military PSYOP activities were consistent with national efforts in theme and content. The committees met periodically between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (2 August 1990) and the start of the air war (17 January 1991) to review PSYOP policy issues against the changing political-military situation, and conveyed their findings to the National Security Council.

Operational-level PSYOP are conducted prior to, during war and conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of the area commander's campaigns and strategies. Tactical, or battlefield PSYOP utilize propaganda and field actions chosen for their psychological influence on the behavior of hostile, foreign audiences within the battle area. <sup>11</sup> During DS/DS, field commanders employed such media as ground-based and airborne radio, loudspeaker broadcasts, and leaflets, and coupled them with other psychological actions. The intent was to create a synergy of information and military action to increase the effectiveness of coalition units, while degrading that of Iraqi forces. The planning for these PSYOP activities was extensive and involved many commands and agencies.

Time-sensitive planning is planning conducted by DOD to react to a crisis situation requiring fast resolution. Deliberate planning represents an ongoing activity having no terminal point. Deliberate planning applies formal decision making tools and information systems to update concepts and plans for contingency operations. Time-sensitive planning was integrated with formal, deliberate planning during DS/DS. Time-sensitive planning alone would not have captured the planning, which had begun well before August 1990. Nor would formal, deliberate planning have accommodated the rapid changes characterizing DS/DS between November 1990 and February 1991. PSYOP planners applied both modes of planning, time-sensitive and deliberate, to bring about strategic flexibility. Three months of staffing eventually produced an approved PSYOP campaign plan supportive of the US Commander in Chief, Central Command (USCINCCENT) theater strategy. Deliberate and time-sensitive planning overlapped considerably during DS/DS, blurring distinctions between the two. Nevertheless, events leading up to and during DS/DS suggest the type of planning used was defined to some extent by recognizable events, as indicated below. USCENTCOM planners used the deliberate planning process

to develop an operational plan for response to a possible, invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A PSYOP annex was included which identified forces and broad themes.

From a PSYOP perspective, the transition from formal to time-sensitive planning can be traced to a determination made early in the crisis by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf that the existing USCINCCENT OPLAN did not fit the changing situation confronting him. The original plans did not take into consideration the scenario that was developing in the Gulf region. The USCINCSOC, who is responsible for DOD PSYOP planning, also had the same perception and offered USCINCCENT assistance in developing a time-sensitive PSYOP support plan. The USCINCCENT accepted the offer and requested the assistance. A cell of twelve PSYOP specialists, which was later increased in Riyadh, a representative from the US European Command (USEUCOM), and a liaison element from the 193rd Special Operations Wing (Pennsylvania Air National Guard), assembled at Mac Dill Air Force Base (AFB) on August 11, 1990 to begin PSYOP planning under the supervision of the Commander, 4th PSYOP Group. After receipt of national strategic PSYOP guidance from the Joint Staff <sup>12</sup>, the cell moved quickly to prepare recommendations as follows: an overall theater concept, a list of proposed strategic PSYOP. initiatives, and specific audiences, objectives, themes, actions, and actors. Within five days the cell briefed a USCENTCOM PSYOP strategic concept to General Schwarzkopf for approval and submission to the Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense. The USCINCCENT sent a message with a list of proposed strategic initiatives one day later. Complications developed when the strategic initiatives reached DOD and interagency committees for concurrence. At issue was the propriety of a field commander not technically in combat making such recommendations within the interagency arena. <sup>13</sup> These questions recurred when the theater campaign plan was submitted for approval one month later. However, the Joint Staff promptly approved Schwarzkopf's PSYOP concept.

On August 31st, the PSYOP planning cell arrived in Riyadh to continue its time-sensitive planning. The mission was to plan for possible hostilities and begin coordinating revised PSYOP force structure necessitated by the updated operations plan, now called Operation DESERT SHIELD. By September 10th, the theater PSYOP campaign plan, nicknamed BURNING HAWK, was being reviewed by various staff personnel at USCENTCOM headquarters, and by month's end it was refined to include a list of specific deception actions that would be recommended for implementation. On September 20th, General Schwarzkopf approved BURNING HAWK. He directed the plan be hand-carried to Washington to expedite approval necessary to assure earliest possible initiation of activities designed to psychologically prepare the battlefield. Quick approval was not obtained, however. Rapid review of the plan was made by some agencies, while differences of opinion on methodology and slow review by staff personnel in other agencies debilitated the approval process. For example, on September 24th, the package flowed quickly in and out of the office of the Director of the Joint Staff. However, at his direction the campaigns and their component actions were divided into two sub plans; a "white" (overt) sub plan to be executed by DOD, and a black (covert) sub plan passed to the CIA as a "recommendation." In fact, few if any of the proposed actions were truly covert. Most of the black actions involved clandestine delivery of overt US

messages through channels not accessible by USCINCCENT, e.g., the Kuwaiti resistance. The planning cell assumed the CIA had such access and therefore suggested it serve as the lead agency. This distinction was apparently lost during the review process.

The actions and campaigns were found to overlap and resist easy division of DOD versus CIA responsibility. Many of the campaigns designated as black had one or more white actions included — such as overt radio broadcasts to the Iraqi forces — which, based on evolving documentation, appear to have been lost. The breakout produced a DOD sub plan which contained a small number of the original recommended, defeating, the interrelated nature of the original concept. The DOD sub plan gained prompt approval by the Joint Staff on September 26, 1990 and initially by the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Security Policy (DUSD-SP). Meanwhile, the entire submission continued to raise questions concerning the appropriateness of DOD tasking other agencies. The process then slowed once again. On October 12th DUSD-SP recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) adopt the remaining actions contained in the white plan. Twenty-one days elapsed before Secretary of Defense Cheney received the plan for his review and approval. Staff review was given as the reason for the delay. Secretary Cheney approved the plan within a day, but another fourteen days passed before the plan found its way back through DOD as each level prepared and cleared its notification message.

Since only a small number of recommended actions were approved, the long-awaited response to USCENTCOM was not well received. In a strongly worded message to the Secretary of Defense, General Schwarzkopf stressed the urgent need to reincorporate without further delay twenty one important PSYOP actions which had been deleted from the original text and which he fully intended to implement. He believed these actions were required to achieve mission success. By early December, Secretary of Defense had approved sixteen of GENERAL Schwarzkopf's twenty one proposals, and overt PSYOP began on January 12, 1991 — five days before the start of the air war phase of Operation DESERT STORM. Although this operation was started later than desired, it was very successful.

## ANALYSIS OF PSYOP IN WAR AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Although PSYOP has traditionally been applied at both the operational and tactical level, these operations have strategic implications. The strength of the coalition and favorable world/region opinion were strategic centers of gravity during DS/DS. Negative information that would threaten these centers of gravity would have a significant negative impact on the entire operation. Similarly, our application of information through an integrated PSYOP campaign had strategic implications on our adversary as well. A detailed examination of PSYOP used during DS/DS was made to determine strategic applications and determine if additional PSYOP strategies should be implemented for future conflicts.

During DS/DS, PSYOP effectively integrated radio broadcasts, loudspeaker activities, leaflet drops, and Enemy Prisoner of Wars (EPW) team actions into combat operations. Their combined effect helped influence 87,000 Iraqis to surrender. Equipment was limited in general but it functioned adequately. Estimated costs for PSYOP totaled sixteen million of the nine billion spent by the coalition for all

operations.<sup>15</sup> Radio broadcasts were initiated in November 1990, coinciding with the buildup of coalition forces, while leaflet drops commenced in mid-January to support and exploit the air war. Loudspeaker and EPW team actions began in January, upon the first major enemy defections, and prior to commencement of the ground campaign.

Initially, a Coalition Warfare Cell, reporting to General Schwarzkopf, was formed in October. The cell was comprised of two Saudi officers, one of whom had received training at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and two US PSYOP officers. The cell's first tasking was from the Saudi General Staff to develop a plan to encourage Iraqi desertions. The resulting draft paralleled relevant parts of BURNING HAWK, which at this time was still a US Top Secret document that was not authorized to be released to the Coalition Warfare Cell. The Egyptians had a cell in Cairo writing a similar plan. The Saudi General Staff then proposed that the three nations produce a single plan. The Coalition PSYOP Cell was then formed within the Psychological Operations Task Force (POTF) to carry out the work. In its final form, the Coalition PSYOP Cell numbered a hundred and was composed of Saudis, headed by a Brigadier General, members of the US 8th PSYOP Battalion, and British, Egyptian and Kuwaiti personnel. Its activities included operating the Voice of the Gulf radio station, translating products, and pre-testing materials. The Saudi Brigadier General was nominally in charge of the cell's day-to-day operations. Products developed by the cell were referred to the Commander of the POTF for initial approval.

Products destined for dissemination via non-US assets were then passed to the Saudi Brigadier General, who sent them to the Saudi Director of Operations, General Mohammed, for appropriate action. If the products were to be disseminated by US forces, the POTF commander passed them to the USCENTCOM Operations Officer, and in turn to USCINCCENT. Upon commencement of the air war, and perhaps because the US had the majority of air and ground equipment required to deliver PSYOP products and PSYOP forces in theater, it appears that tactical PSYOP development and dissemination were handled predominantly by the US approval chain.

According to 1992 figures, 86,743 Iraqi prisoners of war were taken as a result of operations DS/DS. <sup>16</sup> Information collected from EPW debriefings by the 13th PSYOP Battalion and others suggests that, although persistent bombing by the coalition had a major effect in diminishing Iraqi will to resist, the PSYOP contribution heightened anxiety effects of the bombing while pointing the way to safety.

"For example, the technique of announcing to an Iraqi unit that it would be bombed on a specific day, then bombing, then again announcing our intention and ability to bomb, was designed to lead the Iraqis to conclude that destruction of Iraqi military equipment was our primary objective, and that abandoning that equipment, surrender, or desertion were their best options for survival." <sup>17</sup>

Enemy prisoner of war surveys indicate broadcast operations reached fifty-eight percent of the Iraqi military target audience, either directly or by word of mouth. Of those who heard them, forty-six percent indicated the broadcasts had an influence on their decision to surrender. Six radio broadcast platforms were used during DS/DS: two aircraft flown by the 193rd Special Operations Wing (SOW), and four

ground radio stations (two in Saudi Arabia and two in Turkey). Initial operations consisted of retransmission of Voice of America broadcasts, both as support of national information programs as well as to establish an Iraqi listening audience. Once permission was received in December to commence overt US military PSYOP broadcasting, an additional program, Voice of the Gulf, was initiated. The format, established the previous September by the PSYOP planning cell, employed pre-taped programs combining news, sports, and music for an average of 17 hours a day, and carried themes of the inevitability of defeat, Saddam's ineffective leadership, and others. Scripts were prepared by the POTF's 8th PSYOP Battalion element within the Coalition PSYOP Cell, and recorded by a Kuwaiti broadcaster whose voice was known in the region. <sup>19</sup>

The principal broadcast radio was a 50 KW transmitter, backed up by mobile 10 KW stations, all organic to the 4th PSYOP Group. However, atmospheric and geological characteristics of the desert reduced ranges to about 140 miles or less for the 50 KW station, and 40 miles or less for the 10 KW transmitters. This limited the ability to reach Iraqi forces in southern Kuwait or along the Iraq/Saudi border. VOLANT SOLO, the 193rd Special Operations Wing airborne broadcast platform, could reach Southern Iraq, and was used to rebroadcast programs from the main station at Quaysumah, but broadcast ranges were limited by the need to orbit outside the range of Iraqi air defense weapons. Once the ground war began and Iraqi air defenses were neutralized, VOLANT SOLO intruded further into Iraqi tactical radio nets with a "Surrender Hotline" for unit commanders. The true objective of this effort was to demonstrate to Iraqi officers that their communications were vulnerable, to force them to use alternate channels, to slow down their responsiveness to our attack, to increase suspicion of their leadership, and cause tighter control of commanders by security forces. Any surrenders generated, and there is no documentation that any were, would be a side benefit.

In September, in response to a National Command Authorities Directive, a video documentary was produced by the 4th PSYOP Group's Dissemination Battalion, entitled "Nations Of The World Take A Stand." The video graphically outlined the enormous military advantage the multinational forces had over Iraq, and the consequences of Saddam Hussein's continued occupation of Kuwait. The video was designed to bring home the message that the US Government and its allies were prepared to defend their interest in the Persian Gulf, and that USCENTCOM was prepared to use force to do so.

Loudspeaker surrender messages broadcast over man portable systems, vehicle, and helicopter mounted equipment, produced moderate effectiveness in terms of audience exposure and persuasiveness. Feedback from EPWs was positive, indicating "...loudspeaker teams told us where to surrender after the leaflets and radio showed us how." The limited ranges of loudspeaker equipment, coupled with the short duration and fast movement of ground tactical operations, appear to explain the lower effectiveness of loudspeaker surrender appeals. Typically, a loudspeaker team would be attached to a forward combat brigade and would consist of one or two noncommissioned officers and an interpreter or communications specialist. Loudspeaker teams broadcast surrender appeals to Iraqi ground units using audio cassette tapes prepared by the POTF's provisionally organized PSYOP Dissemination

Battalion. If the team included a speaker of Iraqi Arabic, and the situation called for deviation from the taped script, the message would be ad libbed by the linguist. The following account illustrates the willingness to take chances of one loudspeaker team whose ad libbed broadcasts produced startling results. This incident occurred on February 20, 1991, as the 101st Air Assault Division was clearing the main supply route to its assault position for the ground phase of DESERT STORM. The presence of any sizable Iraqi force along that line would have threatened the 101st's ability to pin down the Republican Guards and facilitate XVIII Airborne Corps' sweep to the west.<sup>21</sup>

"We had to persuade the company commander to let us PSYOP people try coaxing the 20 Iraqi Guards out of their underground bunker. "Sir, the 101st's pounding all morning didn't do it, " we said, "so why not give us a try?" The three of us arranged for a Blackhawk helicopter to ride us to the bunker area. When we arrived, we began dropping leaflets. Nothing happened — no surrenders, no movement, nothing. We flew back to base and got the idea to try loudspeakers. We jumped back on the Blackhawk, this time with our speaker system and an audio cassette tape. We pointed to a spot on the ground about 800 meters from the bunker and started broadcasting downward. Again nothing. We figured we couldn't be heard 'cause of the noise of the rotor blades. We motioned to our pilot to land us near the spot. With what you might call serious reservation (but with) a kind of a feeling of protection from another Blackhawk up to our right plus three Apaches in the area, the pilot eventually let us down. He took right off, yelling he'd stay with us over the radio.

Three of us were now on the ground staring at this bunker with 20 Republican Guards in it. Captain Wright lifted the speaker from the sand, then me and Jensen picked up the cord and other stuff. We started running closer. We stopped dead after about 200 more meters, sat down our equipment, snapped in the tape, and started blasting the surrender message. Still nothing. After a while, Captain Wright lifted the speaker again and began carrying it even closer. He kept walking until the electrical cord jerked him to a stop at 50 meters. He stood up and pushed the speaker high over his head, and like some kind of statue, he stood there for a while pointing the speaker at bunker. Nothing! I turned off the tape and told Jensen, who was fresh out of language school, to go live, and to keep on talking until something happens.

After a few minutes, a voice crackled over our radio. It was our pilot saying he'd saw movement. We began to see it. Little by little and soldier by soldier, movement came from that hole. The Iraqis coming our way were waving little white flags instead weapons. About 20 came out before our pilot ordered us to return to base to refuel when we finally got back, the three of us and the pilot started getting all kinds of congratulations. The guys were saying we captured [not 20 Iraqis that Intelligence were in the bunker but ]about 435 Iraqis. The Republican Guards (sic) just kept crawling out after we left."

The use of leaflets in combination with combat operations proved particularly effective. Of a targeted audience of 300,000 Iraqi troops, an estimated ninety-eight percent were exposed to the 79 million leaflets dropped in the theater. Many of the 87,000 Iraqis who surrendered were found clutching leaflets or hiding them in their uniforms at the time of surrender. Debriefings of EPWs by the 13th PSYOP Battalion indicated leaflets were effective in influencing Iraqis to abandon their equipment and

surrender to coalition forces. Additionally, an Iraqi Brigadier General, captured by the British on February 27th, was quoted as saying "Second to the allied bombing campaign, PSYOP leaflets were the highest threat to the morale of the troops." The leaflet bombs and bundles were packed by the POTF's PSYOP Dissemination Battalion, and transported by the US Air Force to King Fahd International Airport, where they were loaded aboard delivery aircraft. Other methods of dissemination included: placing leaflets in bottles and floating them up on Kuwaiti beaches to support deception operations, faxing, hand carrying, and special artillery shells.

Starting in January 1991, Special Operations MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft of the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) began dropping leaflets in quantities up to one and a half million, from positions south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, allowing the wind to carry the leaflets over the border. Once the air war started, F-16 fighter-bombers dropped leaflet bombs on Baghdad; FA-18 and B-52 aircraft were also employed as missions required. In addition to leaflets, the 1st Special Operations Wing also dropped eleven 15,000 lb. bombs with considerable psychological effect. These bombs were originally designed to clear minefields, create landing zones, and neutralize key command and control facilities, but intelligence reports indicated the effects on Iraqi morale were equally impressive, and they were further exploited by special leaflets. Leaflets were designed to strike cultural and emotional chords among Iraqi soldiers. Initial designs were redrafted after testing involving feedback from EPWS. In fact, leaflet pretesting, post-testing, redesign, and redistribution proved to be among the more notable functions on which the 13th and 8th PSYOP Battalions collaborated. EPW teams from the 13th obtained regular feedback from cooperative Iraqi pre-war line crossers and EPWs in four camps to "determine which products were successful and, more importantly, why." The 13th conveyed the information to product development personnel in the Coalition PSYOP Cell for redesign and subsequent improved leaflet effectiveness.

Adjustments made in this way proved culturally enlightening as well as effective for PSYOP personnel. For example, red ink had been used in the initial design of some early leaflets. Pre-testing revealed that red in the Iraqi culture signaled danger and should be avoided. The 8th PSYOP Battalion switched to other colors, as appropriate, for subsequent products. Another set of leaflets had depicted a clean-shaven coalition soldier gesturing affably to an Iraqi. PSYOP teams found that a chin with no beard did not convey as positive a signal as did one with a beard, which signified Muslim holiness and trust to many Iraqis. Later leaflets portrayed coalition soldiers with beards unless they were western (US) soldiers. A particularly successful leaflet depicted Iraqi and coalition soldiers sharing Islamic hospitality over a bowl of fruit. Bananas were added to the design after pre-testing revealed that bananas were a delicacy for Iraqis.

Starting in late February 1991, PSYOP forces of the 8th PSYOP Battalion shifted focus in support of ARCENT - directed consolidation operations under Task Force Freedom. Task Force Freedom was responsible for the emergency restoration of services and facilities within Kuwait City and its surrounding area, and was composed of PSYOP, civil affairs, engineer, medical, military police, and aviation units. PSYOP elements formed a PSYOP Task Force (POTF) consisting of a Propaganda Development Cell,

Print Company (-), and Media Company (-) from the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion; and loudspeaker assets from the MARCENT PSYOP Support Element.

This POTF supported activities throughout the transition from military clearing operations to the reintroduction of civilian control, and the accompanying restoration of public services. After providing assets to re-broadcast Radio Kuwait from Damman, POT'F media personnel assisted in the reestablishment of Kuwaiti AM/FM and TV facilities, and provided a series of public service announcements. Similarly, print personnel provided assessments and technical assistance in the restoration of Kuwaiti commercial and government print facilities and printed over one million posters, handbills, and leaflets to facilitate the re-establishment of humanitarian relief and security throughout Kuwait City. POTF loudspeaker assets supported clearing operations by Saudi and Kuwaiti forces, and broadcast public service announcements.

#### CONCLUSION

PSYOP will be critical to success in future conflicts. These conflicts will continue to take on a new dimension with continued involvement in Peace operations. However, our current policy does not clearly demonstrate to decision-makers a capability to provide PSYOP support to the CINC's in pursuit of the national security strategy. It offers little justification to continue current level of force structure. Despite all the numerous successes of tactical and operational PSYOP during DS/DS, there is no guarantee that adequate PSYOP units and personnel will be available to take on the more challenging peacetime operations conducted by the regional CINCs. The United States plays a key role in supporting efforts to enlarge the community of secure, free-market and democratic nations, and create new partners in peace and prosperity. The control and use of strategic information by employing PSYOP is key to achieving this objective.

PSYOP served as a timely and cost-effective force multiplier for achieving our objectives in DS/DS. Nearly 87,000 EPWs resulted from the synergy of air and ground combat operations, and PSYOP. An important explanation for this success was the flexibility applied in planning time-sensitive issues, in mobilizing and deploying PSYOP forces, and in conducting theater operations. Radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, loudspeaker activities, and EPW team actions proved effective when integrated into the combat operations. The PSYOP product pre-testing and post-testing procedure, which applied feedback from cooperative EPWS, proved especially important to make changes as the situation dictated. It supported rapid design and redesign of leaflets by the PSYOP Task Force. The utility of having broadcast and print capability organic to Army PSYOP units was revalidated. Joint Service cooperation in broadcast and leaflet delivery operations were excellent. The creation of a combined PSYOP cell facilitated multi-national coordination of battlefield PSYOP effort and support, and in fact was crucial to the process.

Significant improvements have been made to revitalize military PSYOP by the creation of USSOCOM. We now have a single point of contact for all military related PSYOP planning and

execution. However, this does not go far enough. DOD must become integrated with public diplomacy, public affairs, and overall national policy. Similar to other key infrastructure within the United States — transportation, airlines, etc. — strategic information needs a primary government coordination office. This office should represent all agencies, the intelligence community, and the commercial information industry.

Private sector firms are already developing and deploying information infrastructure today to compete in the global economy. The magnitude of the information transformation has been enormous and has an impact on a majority of the world's population. A possibility now exists to use this information in a negative manner to attack people and institutions. The recent virus attack against large internet companies is a good example of this. There are essential roles for government in this information transformation process. Carefully crafted government action will complement and enhance the efforts of the private sector and assure the growth of an information infrastructure available to all Americans at reasonable cost. In developing our policy initiatives in this area, the Administration should work in close partnership with business, labor, academia, the public, Congress, and state and local government. Efforts should be guided by the following principles and objectives:

- Promote private sector investment, through appropriate tax and regulatory policies.
- Develop standards for security of information systems. Ensure information security and network reliability. The information infrastructure must be trust-worthy and secure, protecting the privacy of its users. Government action will also ensure that the overall system remains reliable, quickly repairable in the event of a failure and, perhaps most importantly, easy to use.
- Develop PSYOP policy and procedures pertaining to the relationship between DOD, the
   Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and other agencies that impact on psychological-political warfare.
- Review the PSYOP force structure along with equipment capabilities. Ensure that Department
  of Defense and law enforcement agencies are resourced and trained to exploit information operations
  and counter cyber threats.
  - Develop guidelines for release and transmission of strategic information that can affect PYSOP.
- Ensure that information resources are available to all at affordable prices. Because information means empowerment—and employment—the government has a duty to ensure that all Americans have access to the resources and job creation potential of the Information Age.
- Act as a catalyst to promote technological innovation and new applications. Commit important
  government research programs and grants to help the private sector develop and demonstrate
  technologies needed for information infrastructure, and develop the applications and services that will
  maximize its value to users.
- Promote seamless, interactive, user-driven operation of the information infrastructure. As it
  evolves into a network of networks, the government should ensure that users can transfer information
  across networks easily and efficiently. To increase the likelihood that the infrastructure will be both

interactive and, to a large extent, user- driven, government must reform regulations and policies that may inadvertently hamper the development of interactive applications.

• Coordinate with other levels of government and with other nations. Because information crosses state, regional, and national boundaries, coordination is critical to avoid needless obstacles and prevent unfair policies that handicap U.S. industry of Department of Defense.

Every new day brings news of change: new technologies, like hand-held computerized assistants; new ventures and mergers combining businesses that not long ago seemed discrete and insular; new legal decisions that challenge the separation of computer, cable, and telephone companies. These changes promise substantial benefits for the American people and a significant capability to use information as an instrument of national power to achieve our National Security Strategy. This includes not only PSYOP, but also manipulation of all types of information traveling in cyberspace. An advanced information infrastructure will enable U.S. firms to compete and win in the global economy, generating economic growth and continued security for the nation. This can become a reality if government understands fully the implications of the information transformation and begins working with the private sector and other interested parties to shape the evolution of the communications infrastructure.

A high tech approach is required now to effectively engage the current and new mediums of strategic information. The standard equipment now in the Army inventory has not been improved in 20 years. The force structure is mostly in the Reserve Component. With the increased number of low-intensity and peace operations with which we have become involved and which will probably continue in the future, it is imperative that our force structure is capable of accomplishing these missions. Continued use of conventional forces in non-conventional warfare will put American soldiers at risk and impede successful mission accomplishments.

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## **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> Dr. Carnes Lord, "PSYOP and the Revolution," Special Warfare, (Summer, 1997): 30.
- <sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), v.
  - <sup>3</sup> Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 79.
- <sup>4</sup> William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington D.C.: The White House, October 1998), iv.
- <sup>5</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996), I-2.
- <sup>6</sup> William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington D.C.: The White House, October 1998), 18.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996), I-1.
  - <sup>8</sup> Ibid., II-1.
  - <sup>9</sup> Department of the Army. <u>Psychological Operations</u>, Field Manual 33-1 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1993), C-1.
- <sup>10</sup> Bryan N. Karabaich, <u>Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/ Storm</u>, (U.S. Department of Defense, Special Operations Command, MacDill Airforce Base, 1993).
- <sup>11</sup> Department of the Army, <u>Division Operations</u>, Field Manual 71-100 (Washington D.C.:U.S. Department of the Army, 1988), 2-23.
- <sup>12</sup> Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Messege (CJSC) 152245Z Aug 1990, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1990).
- <sup>13</sup> Brian N. Karabaich, <u>Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Desert Storm</u> (MacDill Airforce Base: Department of Defense Special Operations Command, 1993), 22.
  - <sup>14</sup> Ibid., 35.
  - 15 Ibid., 38.
- <sup>16</sup> Final Report to Congress, <u>Conduct of the Persian Gulf War</u>, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1992), 48.
- <sup>17</sup> USA Military Police Operating Agency, <u>Gulf War After Action Review</u>, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1992), 124.
- <sup>18</sup> Brian N. Karabaich, <u>Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Desert Storm</u> (MacDill Airforce Base: Department of Defense Special Operations Command, 1993), 62
  - 19 Ibid., 71.

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